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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE UNDOING
OF THE WESTPHALIAN STATE
Daniel Philpott*
Not so long ago, in 1998, the world acknowledged both the fiftieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 350th
anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia. The Universal Declaration was
celebrated in the popular press, by thousands of activists, and at well
attended open forums at schools and universities. Westphalia was noted
almost exclusively at academic conferences. But public obscurity is an
undeserved fate for Westphalia, for its legacy in organizing our political
world vies with that of the American and French revolutions. What
Westphalia inaugurated was a system of sovereign states where a single
authority resided supreme within a set of borders, constitutionally un-
challengeable from within and without. Further warranting our
remembrance are signs of its undoing. What Westphalia once secured in
1648 is cracking in ever widening webs. Since the end of the Cold War,
international authorities-the United Nations, the European Union,
NATO, others-have sanctioned intervention in venues as diverse as
Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Liberia, the Sudan, and Kosovo. All of these actions pry open
the old doors of the norm of non-intervention, one of Westphalia's key
attainments. They reverse history's momentum, for in consolidating a
system of sovereign states, Westphalia ended centuries of evolution away
from frequent, fierce, intervention. The Peace of Westphalia fastened the
state's authority from outside claims, sealing the state as a vault. This
seal would persist well into the twentieth century; the system of abso-
lutely sovereign states that Westphalia wrought would prove to be one of
modernity's most enduring institutions.
The tightness of the original seal resulted from the pressures of
Westphalia's arrival. Over a century before Westphalia, Protestant re-
formers led thousands of Europeans to defy the Catholic Church, which
in turn led Catholic authorities to respond with quelling armies, bringing
on a century of battles and skirmishes, on and off, erupting finally into
the holy cataclysm of the Thirty Years War, a war that took life on a scale
unrepeated in Europe until the Twentieth century. This is why monarchs
after Westphalia no longer intervened to enforce their religion. It is also
in good part why the political authority of the Pope and Emperor faded.
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We may have also forgotten the carnage that brought us the sover-
eign state. Remembrance, though, may be worrisome. If today's erosion
of sovereignty parallels early modern Europe's development of it, might
not the same holy chaos skulk behind the changes? It seems unlikely at
first. The new intervention is fueled by common aversion to mutually
recognized suffering-starvation, anarchy, civil war-and not the par-
ticular claims of any revealed religion. Yet, religion and culture are
neither irrelevant nor irenic in today's international politics. The conflict
they provoke is not only still with us, but since the Cold War has
swelled, not faded-most dramatically in the attacks of September 11,
2001. Involving non-state actors who pressure states to achieve their
ends, sometimes carrying out violence themselves, often pursuing goals
that involve populations in foreign states, it is the sort of conflict that
makes heavy demands on sovereignty.
That era-prior to Westphalia-and this era, then, face two parallel
trends: flux in sovereignty, and religious and cultural conflict. Out of
both trends, in both eras, a common dilemma arises: If the sovereign
state is to be pried open, with interference in its internal affairs increas-
ingly permitted, are there shared values on which the interference can be
grounded? The scale, breadth, and urgency of suffering evokes the hope
for common norms by which sovereignty is limited. Or will the opening
invite in holy chaos? The rise of religious and cultural conflict awakens
the fear that claims on sovereignty will become rampant and uncontain-
able. Is there a set of values whose claims to interfere with sovereignty
can attain a global consensus but that do not deepen religious and cul-
tural dissension? To put the question in the spirit of the present
symposium, can international norms accommodate diversity? Or will
attempts to construct them invite cacophony? The dilemma is heightened
most by the advocacy of certain norms that are both arguably universal,
justly demanded upon states, as well as religious in their content, evok-
ing deep value conflicts. The human right of religious freedom, re-
asserted vigorously by American religious activists over the past decade
and now the subject of vigorous oversight by the U.S. government, is
precisely such a norm. Why the dilemma is difficult and why religious
freedom is the most troublesome aspect can be understood through the
agonistic politics of early modern Europe.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE
Early modern Europeans lived on the cusp between a system of sov-
ereign states and much less streamlined organization of politics. This is
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the first resonant parallel between that era and our own. Of course, his-
tory was moving in the opposite direction. Westphalian sovereign
statehood consolidated centuries of evolution away from the high Middle
Ages, a metamorphosis that appears sharpest in relief against this previ-
ous season at its peak. In the medieval Respublica Christiana, political
authority was dispersed among the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor,
kings, nobles and bishops, but none of these authorities held sovereignty
or supreme authority within a demarcated territory. Indeed, they thought
of themselves as members of a common civilization with a common
faith and shared values. Following its apogee, though, the Middle Ages
shed its both its institutional diversity and its moral consensus. Over the
next three and a half centuries section by section of the European land-
scape lost its political eclecticism and took on the form of a sovereign
state.
The Peace of Westphalia consolidated this trend in 1648, signaling
the official end to the Thirty Years War. Based on the principles of equal-
ity, autonomy, and a balance of power among states, the agreement
settled disputes over religion, the powers of the Pope and the Emperor,
and the boundaries and authority of particular policies-all compatibly
with sovereign statehood. An obstinate Pope Innocent X issued a Bull,
Zel Domus, calling the treaties, "null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust,
damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time,"
but a clause in the settlement had already declared pre-emptively that his
protests would not nullify the treaties.1 In practice, this clause prevailed.
Westphalia was a change of the most fundamental sort. It was, to be
sure, a transition in hegemony-from the Habsburg Empire to France
and Sweden, defenders of the sovereign state-but it also stood for much
more. The signers of the agreement regarded themselves as the "Senate
of Christian Europe," but what they created was substantially more than
a new organization among states, such as the League of Nations or
United Nations. What arose at Westphalia was foundational-a new
"constitution of international relations," defining the basic legitimate
political entities and their fundamental prerogatives. The sovereign state
which it prescribed was Janus-faced, its government staring both inward
at its subjects, over which it had supreme authority, and outward beyond
the state's borders, where no rival authority was entitled to force a
change in the governance of its inhabitants.
Fundamental change in the organization of politics was the result of
conflict over deep-seated questions of religion. The generative fire of
confessional conflict is a second, more darkly redolent, parallel between
early modem Europe and today. Although the past generation of social
1. DAVID MALAND, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 16 (1966).
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scientists has mostly described the state as an efficient adaptation to eco-
nomic and technological changes, these scholars have demonstrated
these forces to be neither thorough nor inexorable. As late as 1517, Em-
peror Charles V was consolidating lands in Spain, central Europe, the
Netherlands, and elsewhere into a vast quasi-medieval conglomerate,
steering Europe sharply away from, not towards, Westphalia. Another
force was needed.2
The Protestant Reformation created parties of Europeans who con-
tested a uniform Catholic public order. Many, although not all, of the
reformers sought to establish their own religion as uniform and public.
The problem of the time, roiling through 130 years of religious warfare,
was one of deep pluralism. Protestants finally won tolerance at West-
phalia. Religious freedom for the individual was still long in coming, but
specified Lutherans and Calvinists in specified regions could at this time
freely practice their reformed creeds. Princes were to be unhindered in
their governance of this practice which stood at the core of their new
sovereignty. Pope Innocent X's condemnation, then, is not surprising,
nor is the papal ban until the 1890's of the writings of Hugo Grotius, the
intellectual godfather of Westphalia.
Philosophers and thoughtful statesmen of the time reflected upon the
surfacing of sovereignty and the fissure of religion, and returned differ-
ing assessments. The dilemma of how to view the sovereign state is the
third parallel between the past era and ours. Philosophers and statesmen
of that time, like those of today, returned a ranging palette of answers.
Many Catholics and Protestants alike insisted upon a uniform religious
order-a restored Christendom for Catholics, confessionally homogene-
ous sovereign states for Protestants. They would fight a holy war for it.
At the other unabashed extreme was Machiavelli, an eager prophet of a
bold and novel secular, sovereign state.
Others were more reluctant and conflicted in their opinions. Still de-
siring a placid and faithful religious uniformity, but convinced that a
sound political order could not endure religious war, many Catholics
were willing to tolerate religious dissent, provisionally, for social peace.
They thought like the politiques, the French Catholics who were willing
to tolerate Huguenots in order to escape from a debilitating civil war.
Outside the borders of the state, too, the politiques preferred state protec-
tion of religious pluralism over continental religious war. The
institutional heart of the politiques' vision was this new, secular sover-
eign state free from the intervention of outside powers.
2. For further elaboration of these claims about the Reformation and the Peace of
Westphalia, see DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 76 (2001).
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A final class of philosophers perceived and accepted the sovereign
state as legitimate, but held that this sovereignty could, under some lim-
ited circumstances, be restricted by outsiders through intervention. These
restrictions were rooted not in the particular claims unique to separate
faiths, but in the duty of all rulers to uphold human values and goods that
anyone could understand by virtue of a capacity to grasp natural law.
Protestants such as Grotius, Hubert Languet, and Alberico Gentili, and
Catholics such as Suarez and Victoria advocated common obligations of
rulers to their people, asserted the duty of every government to uphold
them, and proposed what we now think of as humanitarian interven-
tion-an exceptional case of interference in another prince's realm,
undertaken only when these common obligations were grossly abused. It
was on a similar basis of natural law that Victoria and other Spanish
theorists of the sixteenth century Salamanca school told their king that
he could not violate the human integrity of colonized natives in the New
World, who, after all, were fully human. Such obligations, they believed,
any rational person could understand, whatever his theological commit-
ments may be.
3
Westphalia, however, in practice sealed shut these philosophers'
dreams of limiting sovereignty for human rights. The absolutely sover-
eign state of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bodin, legitimately free from all
intervention, won out instead. Westphalia, then, resolved the dilemma
that haunts both early modern Europe and our own era: the status of the
sovereign state. It is a dilemma created by two trends that both periods
also experienced-the flux of sovereignty and religious tumult. Neither
outside states nor international institutions could legitimately interfere in
states' internal affairs. The sovereign state would prove robust, what Max
Weber called an "iron cage," outlasting the religious furor that founded
it. Since Westphalia, exceptions to and violations of the state's immunity
from external interference have arisen, while the legitimate holders of
sovereignty inside the state have also evolved from monarch to constitu-
tion or modern dictatorship. But for three centuries, the sovereignty of
the state with respect to outside authorities has remained fairly constant,
not unrevised, but constant, even while domestic holders of sovereignty
have often changed. As late as 1960, the sovereign state was replicating
itself across the globe as European colonial empires collapsed. It became
the first universal form of political organization in history. This apotheo-
sis came about only a generation ago.
3. On contrasting theories of sovereignty, see EH. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (1986).
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II. SOVEREIGNTY AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT TODAY
Germany and gargantuan death were the site and circumstance of
Europe's acceleration away from a universal polity to sovereign state
segmentation in early modem Europe. In the twentieth century, it was
Germany and the most gargantuan death in Europe since early modem
times that led nations everywhere to begin again to reassert universal
values that would restrict state sovereignty. Demonstrating the extremity
of what a state could inflict when completely immune from outside criti-
cism and interference, the Holocaust prodded Westphalia's reversal.
It was the Holocaust and the destruction resulting from World War
II that animated the vast majority of states to sign the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in 1948, the year of Westphalia's tricentennial.
Human rights would later gain legal clout from two United Nations
covenants on human rights, several other covenants promoting specific
rights, and from the European Court of Human Rights, whose substantial
judicial powers limit state sovereignty. After the Cold War, human rights
norms achieved a great advance forward in their assault on Westphalian
sovereignty after the Cold War when international bodies began to au-
thorize intervention where human rights abuses and massive suffering
were taking place.
The first historically parallel trend, a transition in sovereignty, then,
is a mirror image of early modem Europe. At that time, the sovereign
state was consolidating; now, the vault of Westphalia is beginning to be-
come unsealed. What of the other parallel trend of religious conflict?
The worldwide acclaim and anger aroused by Samuel Huntington's
"clash of civilizations" thesis, holding that the key global conflicts will
increasingly be fought between religiously defined civilizations, testifies
to the resonance of religious and cultural conflict.4 Whether Huntington
correctly identifies the world's civilizations or overstates their coherence
or susceptibility to conflict, a broad consensus of scholars will at least
agree on the rising salience of religious and cultural loyalties over the
past two decades and on the increased conflict between the societies of
Islam and Asia with the West.
5
4. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996).
5. See, e.g., BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD Vs. MCWORLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBAL-
ISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD (1995); PETER L. BERGER, THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE
WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS (1999); JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RE-
LIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994); MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW COLD WAR?
RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE (1993); Rodney Stark, "Seculari-
zation, R.IP.," 3 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 60 (1999).
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In an "Islamic Resurgence'" most of the world's Muslim states, from
Indonesia to Iran, have over the past two decades become more alienated
from the West in their orientation, out of a renewed confidence in their
own civilization, out of a reaction to a Western drive to universalize and
spread its own civilization, and because of non-cultural factors such as
rapid population growth and attendant unemployment and dislocation.
The results have included tensions over weapons proliferation, Islamic
migration into western societies, control of oil, the role of the West in
conflicts involving Muslims such as the one Bosnia, and, disputes over
the universality of human rights. At the 1995 U.N. Women's Conference
at Beijing, for instance, Islamic states objected to the extent and nature
of rights demanded for women, while at the 1993 U.N. Conference on
Population Control in Cairo, Muslim states, as well as the Vatican, were
at odds with UN elites over contraception as an element of family plan-
ning. Most poignantly, though, the Islamic resurgence has brought
terrorism. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were indeed carried out by
a faction of Islamic "revivalists" who, convinced that Islam had fallen
into a pre-Mohammedan state of jahilliya, or barbaric ignorance, vowed
jihad against defilers of Islamic civilization like the United States.
Cultural conflicts between Asian societies and the West, especially
the United States, became more frequent in the 1990s as well. While
Asian intellectuals and political leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan
Yew asserted an "Asian Way" that dethroned political and civil rights in
favor of cultural solidarity and the right to economic development,
America has threatened to place economic sanctions upon Asian coun-
tries that violate human rights. In many contexts and venues,
representatives of the West have asserted constitutional freedoms as uni-
versal entitlements, only to encounter Asian denials. In 1993, human
rights activists touted that year's UN World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna as an opportunity to develop a broad consensus on uni-
versal human rights, but found themselves blocked by a coalition of
mostly Asian and Islamic countries, who prevented agreement on any-
thing but the most paltry statement of common beliefs. In the Bangkok
Declaration just prior to the conference, a coalition of Asian states
strongly opposed the "universal human rights regime" as a Western form
of particularism and stressed in its place the principles of national sover-
eignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity. Similar disputes have
arisen as diplomatic incidents. In the summer of 1997, for example, the
prime minister of Malaysia told the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine
Summer 20041
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Albright, that his country no longer subscribed to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.6
None of these contemporary cultural tensions amount to, or even au-
gur, the religious wars of early modem Europe. There are, however,
resemblances in spirit. The cultural conflicts, for instance, have arisen
over values that make claims across borders: Western human rights ad-
vocates and Islamic contenders both assert what is true for all people; Al
Qaeda is a non-state actor who claims to speak on behalf of the umma,
the globalized community of Muslims, and is determined to fight its
enemies in whatever state they may exist; and Asian values, Confucian
or Japanese Shinto, pertain to entire cultures, not single states. In re-
sponse, the U.S. and other Western states intervene in other states to
fight Islamic terrorism and make claims on the behavior of Asian states
like China towards their own citizens. All over the world, much of the
religious violence is secessionist or irredentist, involving the assertion of
loyalties across borders. All such conflicts place heavy demands on sov-
ereignty.
There are two historical trends, then, in which the present day mir-
rors early modem Europe. One is the plight of living between a system
of sovereign states and a system with more variegated authority; the
other is religious and cultural conflict. Completing the parallel between
the present and the past era is a common dilemma to which the two
trends, in the two periods, give rise. In a world of states where sover-
eignty is not absolute, where intervention often occurs, and where the
proponents of universalistic religions and philosophies make more and
more conflictual claims on other states' inhabitants, can we find a set of
values that would justify intervention that commands at least a thin con-
sensus of the international community? In other words, can we pry open
the doors and poke holes in the walls of the Westphalia vault without
letting delirium escape? In early modem Europe, the natural law phi-
losophers' dream of attaining such a consensus failed; the era resolved
its dilemma instead with an absolute proscription of intervention. To-
day's increase in cultural and religious conflict again gives rise to the
same lamentable possibility. Just as Third World states were loathe to
endorse humanitarian intervention during the Cold War, lest the super-
powers would use it as a pretext for intervening for their own ideological
causes, states today are unlikely to endorse norms that curtail sover-
eignty at a time when it is being increasingly violated by states and
organizations with rivaling cultural and religious identities.




Yet, today's international community arguably has dealt with the di-
lemma far more successfully. Since the end of the Cold War, states, even
ones of differing ideology, culture, and regime, despite their growing
cultural differences, have in fact been able mutually to agree upon inter-
vention in many cases. In Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, Rwanda,
Namibia, Cambodia, the Sudan, Liberia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Kos-
ovo, and elsewhere -enough instances to constitute a substantial trend
-the UN, the European Union, NATO, the Organization of American
States, and other international bodies, although not all in every conflict,
have approved. These were measures that the consensus of states would
have regarded as illegitimate interference by the standards of the Cold
War and earlier times. In most of these cases, the interveners did not ob-
tain the prior consent of the target state's government or the parties to a
conflict, thus exceeding traditional peacekeeping operations that de-
ferred to state sovereignty. The interventions, for instance, have
delivered humanitarian food and medicine in war and famine, ended war,
enforced peace, attempted to rebuild institutions, overthrown govern-
ments which violate human rights and democracy, conducted and
monitored elections, and arrested war criminals.7
Not all of the interventions have been successful. Few of them have
attained all of their original goals; most have resulted in mixed success;
many of them have been unilaterally carried out, even if internationally
sanctioned; and none was accomplished without disagreement among
the major powers. Interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, for example, failed
to win the approval of the UN Security Council. But what is historically
remarkable is the cooperation of Security Council states in most of the
cases. China, which constantly protested outside infringement of its sov-
ereignty during this period, openly opposed intervention only in the
cases of Kosovo and the Iraq war of 2003, and at worse abstained from
Security Council votes in the other cases. Islamic states frequently sup-
ported the operations too. In 1996, Pakistan and Bangladesh were the
two leading contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping and observer
missions. The international consensus on intervention, then, though far
from unblemished, is significant.
International judicial institutions that circumscribe sovereignty have
also obtained a broad international consensus. During the 1990's, United
Nations tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda as well as the International
Criminal Court were established to try people who had committed large-
scale human rights violations, even within the borders of a single state.
Though the opposition of the United States to the International Criminal
7. See Oliver Ramsbotham, Humanitarian Intervention, 1990-95: A Need To Recon-
ceptualize?, 23 REv. INT'L STUD. 445 (1997).
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Court detracts from this consensus, the court still commands the support
of a whole spectrum of states representing a wide variety of cultures.
Here, too, although not absolutely solid, the consensus is widespread.
Finally, in Europe, over twenty states have now combined their sover-
eign powers in the supranational institution of the European Union, the
most radical departure from traditional Westphalian sovereignty to date.
In sum, it seems that today we have come much closer than the early
modem Europeans to realizing the dream of those philosophers Grotius,
Victoria, Suarez, Gentili, and Languet, who tolerated the sovereign state,
but supported intervention against princes who committed commonly
recognizable atrocities. Most of the wrongs redressed by today's inter-
ventions-starvation, genocide, human rights violations, war crimes-
are similarly widely recognized wrongs. Cultures that may clash over
other issues can recognize these conditions as worthy of international
remedy.
Witnessing the "commonness" of these evils are also broad groups
of philosophers and theologians from the very traditions whose peoples
are increasingly clashing. Scholars of Islamic ethics such as Sohail
Hashmi argue that humanitarian intervention and "core human rights"-
rights to life, bodily integrity, subsistence-find strong support in main-
stream Islamic theology.8 The Western tradition, which is home to the
doctrine of human rights, is strengthened by the strong support of human
rights by the Catholic Church following the 1960's Vatican II council,
and by many Protestant denominations. Many scholarly and public
spokespeople for Asian cultures, too, insist that none of the communal
Asian virtues preclude endorsement of core universal human rights. To-
day's consensus is, therefore, substantial in both philosophy and
practice. 9
III. THE DIFFICULT MATTER OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The contemporary era, then, will not be one in which the sovereign
state remains sealed shut. With greater consensus on the appropriateness
of interference in borders on behalf of human rights, the contemporary
sovereign state can be opened without unleashing delirium. There re-
main, however, issues on whose behalf some will propose to limit
sovereignty but that will be hotly contested and inimical to the revival of
8. Sohail Hashmi, Is There An Islamic Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention?, in ETHICS
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? 55 (1993).
9. See Max Stackhouse & Stephen E. Healey, Religion and Human Rights: A Theo-




the early modem philosophers' project of finding common values to
serve as a basis for intervention. The most prominent of these is religious
freedom. As international legal documents articulate it, religious free-
dom is a right enjoyed through worship, public expression of beliefs,
education of children into such beliefs, the operation of houses of wor-
ship, schools, universities, seminaries, enjoyment of freedom from
discrimination in employment and political access, and the liberty to
take up, abandon, proclaim or dissent from one's religion. States threaten
this right when they limit these practices through killing, imprisonment,
torture, or otherwise discriminating against believers
But this only describes a familiar right, one among many in the lib-
eral pantheon. Why is it that religious freedom is so potentially
disruptive? Largely it is because of the frequency, breadth, and increas-
ing scale of its violation. This was the claim, at least, of activists who,
during the mid-1990's, succeeded in beginning a national debate in the
United States over religious persecution abroad.' 0 The chief victims, they
claimed, are Baha'is in Iran, Buddhists in Tibet, but most numerously,
Christians. It is mainly driven by fundamentalist Islamic governments,
Asian governments, especially China, and remaining Communist gov-
ernments who punish and often kill dissenting worshippers. Systematic
and reliable accounts have since corroborated claims of persecution, es-
pecially the annual reports of the State Department's Office of
International Religious Freedom and the independent Commission on
Religious Freedom, established in 1999.11 Ranging from discrimination
to death, the violations are not all equivalent and are not all committed
by governments. Many are the work of terrorist groups whom govern-
ments are powerless to stop. Yet the breadth of denials of religious
freedom is nevertheless striking. The most egregious cases are China and
the Sudan. In China, the entire population of Tibetan Buddhists has long
been persecuted. Christian churches are placed on an official register
which admittedly allows ten million Catholics and four million Protes-
tants to worship legitimately, but which also allows the government
rigidly to restrict these churches' governance and practice, and, more
seriously, to prohibit the worship of an estimated forty to sixty million
other Christians. In 1996 and 1997, the government carried out a sys-
tematic campaign to eliminate illegal worship, imprisoning and torturing
leaders of house churches. In the Sudan, the Muslim government has
10. The most prominent accounts were NINA SHEA, IN THE LION'S DEN: THE GROW-
ING WORLDWIDE PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS (1997); and PAUL MARSHALL, THEIR BLOOD
CRIES Our (1997).
11. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: A GLOBAL REPORT ON FREEDOM AND
PERSECUTION (Paul Marshall, ed., 2000); KEVIN BOYLE AND JULIET SHEEN, FREEDOM OF
RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT (1996).
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waged civil war against Christians and animists within their borders, tak-
ing over a million of their lives. Systematic and significant restriction of
religious freedom is also found in Iran, Vietnam, Pakistan, Cuba, Saudi
Arabia, Algeria, North Korea, and elsewhere.
The magnitude of the violations-torture, killings, prohibitions of
worship--explains why religious freedom has received so much atten-
tion, but not why it provokes such deep dissension over whether it ought
to be the object of concern to outside states. Religious freedom is not
only an enemy of thuggery and dictatorship, but is also rejected as a mat-
ter of principle by some authorities of religious and cultural traditions.
For them, religious freedom is not a universal human right, but rather an
abdication of an imperative to practice and promote faith publicly. A
broad consensus of Muslim scholars interpret full religious freedom as
contrary to shari'a, or revealed divine law. Even those who find Muslim
theology compatible with a broad set of universal human rights often
object to the right of Muslims to convert to other religions, and the rights
of non-Muslims to practice their faith. Although there is an Islamic tradi-
tion of allowing "people of the book"-i.e., Christians and Jews-to
worship in enclaves, the tolerance is often shaky, and in any case hardly
amounts to a right to religious freedom for individuals. Most egre-
giously, governments in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Oman persecute and restrict the religious
freedom of religious minorities and dissidents who convert away from
Islam.12 There is a more familiar, secular version of uniformity in Com-
munism, too, which cannot allow dissent from its governing ideology.
Such principled opposition to religious freedom detracts from an interna-
tional consensus that this right ought to limit state sovereignty.
For all of this cacophony, though, religious freedom finds strong
support in international norms, most importantly, the international legal
and declaratory tradition of human rights. Religious freedom is articu-
lated forcefully in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, a document that has been signed by virtually every state. A thor-
ough version of the right to religious freedom has also been given legal
status in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well
as in the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. It is a
right that is firmly ensconced in international law.
Religious freedom is also at the heart of the legal traditions and con-
temporary constitutions of individual states. Having gained immense
12. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious
Dissidents Under Classical and Contemporary Islamic Law, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 387 (Witte & van der Vyer eds., 1997).
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international prestige through the American and French Revolutions,
religious freedom is recognized by the constitution of virtually every
western liberal democratic government, as well as by all but a handful of
every other constitution in the world-even those of Muslim and Asian
States. Twenty-three out of thirty-four majority Muslim states have
signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; there is
even a substantial minority of Islamic scholars advocating an "Islamic
Reformation" based on a reinterpretation of the Koran that allows the
full political toleration of non-Muslims, along with democracy and a
distancing of ecclesiastical and temporal authority.'
3
Other major world religions endorse religious freedom as well. Prot-
estant sects were the first to develop a theological basis for it. The
Catholic Church has been a major voice for religious freedom ever since
it issued the papal encyclical Dignitatis Humanae in 1965, and Pope
John Paul II has spoken of it forcefully and repeatedly. Jews are also un-
surprisingly strong proponents of it, as are Buddhists and many Hindus.
The dilemma that religious freedom poses is this: although religious
freedom is central to the tradition of human rights, expressed in both
international and constitutional law and in moral and religious sources, it
is also contrary to the principled policies of several contemporary re-
gimes. It is a right that, if valid, ought to limit the sovereignty of states,
yet one whose validity is deeply contested. Again, recall the historical
parallel; during the wars of the Reformation, some parties courted vi-
cious conflict through their claims for universality, while others
advocated the tolerance embodied in sovereignty but compromised the
universal obligations to which all rulers would be accountable. Relin-
quishing an important human rights commitment or provoke conflict
over deep values: this is the difficult choice.
To side with the human rights tradition is to endorse its claims upon
the sovereignty of violator regimes and the legitimacy of the tools
through which these regimes might be pressured-if not military inter-
vention, then certainly condemnations, judicial proceedings, sanctions
by international organizations, and threats by other states to withdraw
military and economic aid. Religious freedom would become one of the
core rights that warrant interference with sovereignty, part of the com-
mon obligation of every ruler. The competing danger is that a religious
and cultural backlash will weaken those institutions and practices whose
limitation on sovereignty now enjoys a frail consensus-intervention,
international judicial norms. The result will either be a resealing of the
13. See the symposium on Islam and democracy in 7 J. OF DEMOCRACY 52 (1996),
especially articles by Bernard Lewis, A Historical Overview, at 52, and Robin Wright, Two
Visions of Reformation, at 64.
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Westphalian vault or a pandemonium of proliferating unilateral claims
upon sovereignty, both of the early modem extremes that ought now to
be avoided.
Given that religious freedom is firmly in the human rights tradition,
yet capable of fracturing it; is religious freedom, then, properly the ob-
ject of scrutiny across borders? There is in fact a strong case to be made
for the scrutiny, for the policy, for the promotion, and against the aban-
donment, of religious freedom. Today, promoting religious freedom is
both more possible and more urgent than it was in early modem Europe.
Then, individual religious freedom was only a remote political possibil-
ity. Only a few philosophers even conceived it; almost no political leader
countenanced it. After a century of religious war, Westphalia's compro-
mise on tolerance for religious groups was the best that European rulers
could achieve. Today, the vast majority of states both endorse the human
rights laws into which religious freedom is written, and include religious
freedom in their own constitutions. Nor is any dispute over religious
freedom likely even to approach war, much less the wars of early mod-
em Europe. The strongest likely US policy, for instance, would involve
diplomatic demarches and mild economic sanctions. While such meas-
ures may heighten tensions between the US and their target states, they
will not cause the clash of civilizations.
The urgency of religious freedom lies most of all in its importance to
the human rights tradition. To neglect it would be to abandon a right that
is not only a central plank in the tradition, but is now being massively
violated, perhaps more than any other class of rights. Abandonment
would, it follows, cripple the credibility of any national policy, interna-
tional regime, or advocacy group committed to human rights. If
international human rights do not embrace a right that is both deeply
institutionalized and yet among the most violated of all rights, then what
does human rights mean at all? The very integrity of human rights, then,
demands that religious freedom be included in the project of building
and fortifying the portfolio of commitments that are thought to properly
limit state sovereignty.
A state committed to human rights should, then, like human rights
NGOs and international organizations, promote religious freedom
abroad. But this policy ought to be balanced against a concern for de-
stroying a consensus around other human rights. Finding this balance is
the present dilemma for American foreign policy. The dilemma has
arisen, to be sure, from the efforts of moral activists who put it there.
Christians are the most numerous, but are far from lone voices. Promi-
nent Jewish leaders, including A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times,
Michael Horowitz of the Hudson Institute, and leaders of B'nai B'rith,
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have spoken out on the issue, finding religious persecution all too haunt-
ing. Rosenthal writes, "If I were Christian I would complain that
Christian leaders, political religious and business, around the world, have
failed in their obligations to fight oppression of their co-religionists. I am
complaining anyway."'14 The National Association of Evangelicals issued
a "statement of conscience" on the subject, joined by the Southern Bap-
tist Convention, the American Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian
Church USA, and the United Methodist Church. The US Catholic bish-
ops have spoken out on this topic as well.
It was in response to this pressure by religious groups that Congress
in the fall of 1998 passed the International Religious Freedom Act,
which ensured the importance of religious freedom in American foreign
policy. Modeled on the 1970's Jackson-Vanik legislation, which was de-
signed to pressure the Soviets to ease their repression of the Jews, the
bill created an Ambassador at Large, a standing Commission on Interna-
tional Religious Persecution, an Office for International Religious
Freedom at the State Department to monitor and report annually on reli-
gious persecution abroad, and required the President to apply sanctions
on violator governments. Possibilities for sanctions ranged from a dip-
lomatic drmarche to a withdrawal of foreign assistance, with the
possibility of a waiver where vital national interests are at stake. The
Office of International Religious Freedom and the Commission on Inter-
national Religious Persecution have now been operating since 1999 and
have each issued five annual reports.
The International Religious Freedom Act has its critics, too. For in-
stance, William Martin, a scholar normally sensitive and fair to religion,
described the Act in Foreign Policy as one mingled in a conservative re-
ligious agenda with predictions about the coming of the Antichrist and a
fundamentalist suspicion of the European Union and the Trilateral
Commission. 5 More surprising still is opposition from the human rights
community itself. Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights
Watch, has dismissed the issue as "special pleading" on behalf of "cer-
tain classes of victims."'16 He told Jacob Heilbrunn of The New Republic
that the claims on behalf of persecuted Christians did not deserve special
status in human rights reports or in policy.'
7
14. A.M. Rosenthal, Persecuting the Christians, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 11,
1997, at A21.
15. William Martin, The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy, 114 FOREIGN
POLICY 66 (1999)
16. Samuel G. Freedman, Horowitz' List, NEW YORK TIMES Magazine, March 31,
1997, at 101.
17. Jacob Heilbrunn, Christian Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1997, at 23.
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These dismissals are troubling. The centrality of religious freedom in
the human rights tradition, its support from a broad array of religions
and denominations, and the breadth of its contemporary violation them-
selves refute the charge that the issue is the narrow concern of a single
lobby. The charge of special pleading is particularly puzzling. Would the
same critics consider human rights campaigns on behalf of South Afri-
can blacks, Soviet Jews, the Argentine "disappeared," the eradication of
female genital mutilation, or the banning of land mines to be special
pleading? Referring to Roth's remark, Heilbrunn commented, "This
seems a remarkable attitude for a human rights activist, since, by defini-
tion, all arguments on behalf of all persecuted groups-racial minorities,
political minorities, ethnic minorities, etc,-are 'special pleadings' in-
tended to help 'certain classes of victims.""' 18 Concerns about narrow
particularity, however, should not to be dismissed entirely; a fair, inclu-
sive policy is one that supports the religious freedom of all believers, not
just Christians. Both the congressional legislation and the annual reports
of the State Department office and of the Commission are inclusive in
precisely this respect. The reports have detailed the denials of the reli-
gious freedom of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, India, China, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, Egypt, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Re-
public, Pakistan, Bangladesh, France, and other European countries, of
Hindus in Bangladesh, of scientologists in Germany and elsewhere, and
of Moonies in Western Europe.
There are, of course, more pragmatic objections to a foreign policy
of combating religious persecution. One is the objection to which I have
already alluded-that it would destroy an already fragile global consen-
sus on human rights, a consensus that has indeed allowed intervention to
remedy colossal human suffering over the past decade. Other objections
are familiar Realist ones toward all human rights policies. Governments
themselves are not always behind the violation of religious freedom.
Sanctions need to take account not merely of the level of a regime's hu-
man rights violations, but also of the trends in its violations; are they
getting better or worse? Sanctions could cause a violator government to
retreat inward, even intensifying its repression. Or, in the case of eco-
nomic sanctions, more damage may be caused to a country's indigent
population than harm to its privileged class. Finally, sanctions may un-
dermine other important foreign policy goals such as peace or stability.
All such considerations are important. But the International Reli-
gious Freedom Act, through its broad range of means, allows a President
to factor all of them into the process. This same flexibility also allows
the President to balance religious freedom with the need for cooperation
18. Id. at 23.
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on other initiatives that properly limit sovereignty-intervention, for in-
stance. Together, Realist objections muster a call for a judicious, case-
by-case religious human rights policy, one balanced against other foreign
policy goals. But, on the whole, Realism hardly nullifies the case for
such a policy. Nor still does it account for past successes of human rights
policies, for instance, in undermining the apartheid regime in South Af-
rica and emboldening eastern European dissidents under communist
regimes.
If religious freedom is to be a robust international norm rather than
the subject of global culture wars, it is also important to strengthen the
global consensus on religious freedom. Consensus is built best in hearts
and minds, which are accessed most easily by civil society actors. Presi-
dent Khatemi of Iran and Pope John Paul II, for instance, have mutually
called for a "dialogue of civilizations" between Christianity and Islam.
But norms are strengthened, too, by the diplomatic actions of states, par-
ticularly actions aimed at coaxing non-signatory states to accede to
human rights conventions that promoted religious freedom. In this way,
religious freedom is coming to enjoy global legal authority.
The best argument favoring religious freedom as a foreign policy
concern is that it draws attention to the actions of regimes that use the
shield of state sovereignty to violate their citizens' rights to worship
freely. The most effective measures of the legislation is its annual review
process, through which it gives global publicity to religious persecution,
holding accountable the violator regimes as well as the White House and
the State Department. The religious freedom policy's key short-term
successes, like the key short-term successes of all human rights policies
of single states, will not likely be major changes in the structures, or
perhaps even the major policies, of foreign regimes. Rather, success lies
in the consistent exposure of cases of imprisonment and torture of reli-
gious dissenters, raids on underground house churches, and the murder
of worshipping minorities. Sometimes success will mean the release of
the prisoners and an end to the raids and murders. But as the example of
South Africa and Eastern Europe teach us, the successes of human rights
policies can be long-term and dramatic, too.
Religious freedom embodies the moral challenge of an international
system that is beginning to move past Westphalia. Unlike early modern
Europe, which could not find an alternative between absolute sover-
eignty and debilitating religious war, the present world has been able to
forge a thin but fragile consensus on values that warrant the circumscrip-
tion of state sovereignty. It is also, however, a world of deepening
religious conflict, where one civilization's skepticism of another's asser-
tions of universality evokes worries of early modern Europe's
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fractiousness. In today's world, the most difficult questions will be ones
over rights and values that some argue to be universal and some argue to
be the ideals of one aggrandizing civilization. Religious freedom is the
best example. The heritage of the human rights tradition suggests that
religious freedom is a universal right. But if it is to enjoy a popular
global consensus that matches its prominence in international treaties,
then such a consensus must be forged-slowly, carefully, through a
process of vigorous and mutual dialogue.
